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CASES NOTED

of the well-established doctrine that seamen are the wards of admiralty,17
this court's holding that a negligent tort-feasor owes no duty to seamen
employed under the lay plan upon the seas appears to be a harsh and unjustifiably severe rule.

BAIL-GRANT TO SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH
Petitioner's appeal from municipal court conviction of a misdemeanor
involving sexual offenses was suspended' and petitioner held pending
hearing in the superior court to determine whether he was a sexual psychopath. The court denied his application for bail. Held, reversed. An alleged
sexual psychopath is entitled to bail as a matter of right pending such
2
hearings. Application of Keddy, 233 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1951).
Historically, the granting of bail in both civil and criminal actions was
within the discretion of the judge.3 The present "right" to bail is dependent
upon statute.4 Constitutional provisions generally apply only to criminal
cases, 5 but the right to bail in all civil actions became fixed by early statutory enactment and is now generally assumed.0 The Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution has also been deemed specifically applicable
only to criminal cases, but there have been instances when courts have
referred to the spirit of the amendment to include civil actions; 7 this right
being unimpaired by the absence of specific legislative authority.8
By great weight of authority, psychopathic hearings are independent 9
17. 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 282 (6th ed., Knauth, 1940); see discussion by Frank,
of the doctrine that seamen are the wards of admiralty, in Hume v. More-McCormack

nes, Inc., 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1941).

1. Upon proper affidavit, criminal proceedings may be suspended and the alleged
sexual psychopath brought before the superior court for examination and hearing. CAL.
WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE

§- 5501 (1949) (as amended).

2. This principle has been twice affirmed: Ex parte Morehead, 237 P.2d 335 (Cal.
1951); Ex parte Rice, 234 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1951).
3. Manning v. Williams, 190 Okla. 65, 120 P.2d 980 (1942).
4. For instance, the CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. § 486 provides for bail in
civil actions as a matter of right. The court in the instant case might have relied
upon this Civil Code instead of the California constitutional guarantees.
5. Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945); State v. Hutchinson,
246 Ala. 48, 18 So.2d 723 (1944); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So.2d 267 (1943).
6. But see Varholy v. Sweat, supra note 5 (quarantine order is not a criminal
proceeding and is not bailable); Espinosa v. Price, supra note 5 (proceedings under
Juvenile Delinquency Act are governed by rules of civil procedure; not constitutional
and statutory provisions for bail in criminal cases); State v. Hutchinson, supra note 5
(constituitional provisions for bail apply only to criminal cases and have no application
to one detained on suspicion of being affected with disease).
7. Mozorosky v. Hulbert, 106 Ore. 274, 211 Pac. 893 (1923); State v. Foster, 84
Wash. 58, 146 Pac. 170 (1915).
8. See Wright v. Henkle, 190 U.S. 63 (1902).
9. Trial court loses jurisdiction when proceedings are suspended, to be regained
only upon negative determination of psychosis by superior court. Ex parte Morehead,
supra note 2.

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
civil actions 10 despite the criminal charges or convictions which supply
the impetus for them in nine states." Several states make mental examination mandatory for enumerated offenses. 12 Generally, commitment is
under civil codes providing for later return to criminal courts.13 However,
one statute is included within the criminal code and permits an indeterminate sentence of one day to life. 14
Most jurisdictions are ill-equipped for the proper treatment of sexual
psychopaths. Consequently they are committed to jail' 5 where the psychosis
and propensity for commission of sex offenses is aggravated. 1 The statutes
have thus proven ineffectual and with the exception of the California law,
have rarely been employed. 17
In releasing petitioner on bail, the majority of the court in the instant
case has relied upon the constitutional guarantee that all persons shall be
bailable except for capital offenses.' 8 The court seems amply justified in
holding that the rights of alleged sexual psychopaths should not be more
restricted than those of persons accused of grave crime." However, justice
Wilson based his dissent upon ethical and moral principles, embodying
society's abhorrence for sexual crime. He draws analogy between the sexual
psychopath and the violently insane.20) The avowed purpose for the
10. Davey v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 12 N.E.2d 144 (1948) (civil and ex parte);
People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 NAV.2d 18 (1942); Ex parte Trante, 238 Mo.
App. 105, 175 S.V.2d 161 (1943) (civil proceeding in personam by state); In re Ryan,
291 Mich. 673, 289 N.W. 291 (1940) (not adversary-i interest of public); But cf.
In re Cook, 218 N.C. 384, 11 S.E.2d 142 (1940) (insanity proceedings neither civil
action nor special proceeding).
11. Cal., Ill., Ind., Mich., Mo., N.Y., Ohio, Wash., Vt. See Comment, Validity
of Sex Offender Acts, 37 Mict. L. Rxv. 613 (1939); Comment, Nature of Commitment Proceedings, 24 TEx. L. REv. 307 (1946).
12. Ohio (all persons convicted of felony), N.J. and N.Y. (enumerated offenses,
i.e.,
rape).
13. CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONs CoDs § 5517, for example, provides for
return to trial court for further prosecution when recovered or no longer dangerous. If
treatment of no further avail, psychopath may be periodically recommitted. For comprehensive statutory comparison, see Comment, Sex Offenders and the Law, 11 U. OF
Pirr. L. Rrv. 636-54 at 645 (1950).
14. NEw YoRK PENAL LAW 2189a, c. 525 § 23 (1950).
15. Note, Commitment of Sexual Psychopaths in Ohio, 2 WESTR.N REs. L. REv. 69
(1950). See In re Kemmerer. 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944) (judicial sanction of confinement of sexual psychopath in county jail).
16. Karpinan, The Sexual Psychopath, 42 J. CalM. L. 184 (1951); Sutherland, The
Sexual P&chopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. 543 (1950).
17. Sutherland, supra note 16.
18. CAL. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 6.
19. Ex parte Henley, 18 Cal. App. 1, 121 Pac. 933 (1912) (inebriate granted
bail pending hearing); contra: People v. Macki, 100 Cal. App. 292, 729 Pac. 821
(1929) (narcotic denied bail).
20. Contra: People v. Tipton, 90 Cal. App.2d 103, 202 P.2d 330 (1949) (sexual
psychopath is not thereby adjudged insane); People v. Haley, 46 Cal. App.2d 618, 116
P.2d 498 (1941) (sexual psychopath statutes do not have same effect as insanity
provisions). See Note, 1 STAN. L. REv. 486-96 (1949) for interpretation of Cal.
Code and distinctions between sexual psychopaths and insane persons.

CASES NOTED
restraint of both is their own and the community's protection.2 1 Thus,
22
the same standard should logically limit their respective freedoms.
It is submitted that the argument advanced by Justice Wilson fails in
3
that even those alleged insane cannot be summarily deprived of liberty.2
In the absence of actual violent insanity, 24 the alleged sexual psychopath
should be entitled to bail. However, the bond set may be high enough
to insure societal welfare and deter the recidivistic tendencies of the sex
25
offender.

EVIDENCE-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES-RIGHT TO
DETERMINE PRIVILEGE OF NON-DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
Plaintiffs, wives of civilian observers killed in the crash of an Air Force
plane, sued for wrongful death under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' They
sent written interrogatories 2 requesting copies of the accident report, but
the Air Force refused to release them, claiming a privilege of non-disclosure.3
The district judge ruled that the United States should produce the documents for his examination and allow the court to determine whether they
are privileged. Upon failure to comply with this ruling the court issued
an order establishing the facts in plaintiffs' favor and enjoined the United
States from introducing evidence to controvert them.5 Held, a claim of
privilege involves a justiciable question, to be determined by the court on
examination of the documents in camera6 and ex parte. Brauner et al. Y.

United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951).
21. People v. Chapman, supra note 10; but see People v. Sims, supra note I1.
22. See Karpman, supra note 16.
23. In re Cornell, Ill Vt. 525, 18 A.2d 304 (1941) (temporary restraint justifiable only if being at large would create danger); Reagan v. Powell, 125 Ca. Rep. 89,
53 S.E. 580 (1906) (alleged insane person entitled to bail pending appeal from sanity
hearing; this right to be denied only if mental condition becomes sufficiently violent to
justify summary process); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Il,
24 Tax. L. REv. 307 (1946) (only five states provide by statute for arrest of alleged
mental defective at time of service of notice of hearing. The general criteria is danger
to self and others.).
24. In which case petitioner should be committed under the mentally ill section
of the statutes. Application of Keddy, 233 P.2d at 163, 164 (Cal. 1951); Ex parte
WVestcott, 93 Cal. App. 575, 270 Pac. 247 (1928).
25. Ex Parte Morehead, suPra note 2 (pattern of past crimes indicated sufficient
recidivistic tendency to warrant setting bail at $7,500). Thus, circuitously, the courts
can prevent the release of those individuals who are dangerous without arbitrarily confining the lesser offenders.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq. (1946).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (allows written interrogatories to be answered by the adverse
party); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (one showing good cause can require production of documents
not privileged).
3. 17 STAT. 283 (1872), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946) (provides that the heads of departments are to prescribe regulations for use, custody, and preservation of classified records,
not inconsistent with law).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (i) (ii) (provides for refusing evidence to contravert
facts and establishes the evidence of moving party as true).
5. 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
6. A hearing before the judge in his private chambers.

